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Whether one approves of General Pervez Musharraf or not, it must 
be admitted that he has won a victory by demonstrating to the world 
the limitations of US power. No other military ruler can claim that he 
could compefthe US president to visit him for a handshake after he 
spurned Washington's publicly proffered advice riot to interrupt the 
democratic process. Whatever dissimulation US officials may indulge 
in to justify President Clinton meeting the general, extremist circles in 
Pakistan are bound to hold it out as a great victory for Pakistani mili-
tary. It is worth remembering that no US president has ever bothered 
to visit Pakistan under democratic rule. Previous visits constituted en-
dorsements of Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan and Mr Clin-
ton's 'stopover' will be interpreted by the Pakistani people as an en-
dorsement extracted by a skilful general from a reluctant US presi-
dent. It should be obvious that the general who ignored the Clinton 
administration's advice against overthrowing a democratic govern-
ment is unlikely to be persuaded in a four-hour stopover to pay any at-
tention to platitudinous pleas to restore democracy. Long before Pres-
ident Clinton yielded to pressure to include Pakistan in his itinerary, 
General Musharraf had indicated that it will be years before democra-
cy would be restored. No one can accuse him of bluffing on this count. 
Instead of worrying about the Clinton stopover in Pakistan, the In-
dian foreign policy and intelligence establishment should focus on ' 
what compels the US president to"behave in this way. In 1971, follow-
ing Dr Kissinger's visit to Beijing via Islamabad, the Nixon adminis-
tration justified the trip with the explanation that 800 million people 
armed with nuclear weapons could not be ignored. Pakistan drew the 
correct lessons from that. It extracted a commitment from US secre-
tary of state General Alexander Haig in 1981 that as a quid pro quo 
for its help to fight the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, the US would 
not interfere with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and do-
mestic politics, namely military rule. The army concluded that its nu-
clear weapon capability would deter the US from interfering in Pak-
istan's internal affairs. Nuclear weapons may not be usable in war but 
they help to compel the US to be engaged. The North Koreans under-
stand it and probably the Iranians too, if we accept the US assessment 
of that country's motivations. When China transferred nuclear 
weapons to Pakistan, its aim was to use that country to countervail In-
dia on the one side and the US in West Asia on the other. Through its 
nuclear proliferation, China has made the point that the sole super-
power and the only 'indispensable nation' can be defied by a general 
from a country on the verge of economic collapse. Nuclear Pakistan is 
a reality and so is its ability to threaten further proliferation. The US is 
helpless in countering the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile axis and 
the threats this poses to proliferation in West Asia. It is, therefore, 
no surprise that the US president does not dare to displease the| 
military rulers of Pakistan. J 
